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PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS
SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
Anne van Aaken*
Christoph Engel**
Tom Ginsburg***
We live in an era of increasing international interdependence, in
which there has been a proliferation of international law and international organizations. Yet our understanding of the workings of international law has not kept pace. While we have a good deal of work on international law doctrine, our analytic tools are much weaker, and we are
far from anything approaching a science of institutional design. We are
therefore ill prepared to advise policy makers in the project of developing effective tools to solve transnational problems and to provide global
public goods.
The hallmark of international law scholarship has been meticulous
doctrinal work. There will always be a need for telling the ought from
the is, for prudently creating consistency, for distilling general principles
from colorful case law, for boldly helping state practice gaining momentum, and for turning these ideas into opinio iuris. However, doctrine is
not the only item on the agenda of public international law as a discipline. Public international law scholars should also assume the role of
outside observers, applying the sharpest analytic tools and the most powerful empirical methodology to their assigned topic. And the discipline
should not exclusively look at the law in force, but also at the law in making, that is, at institutional design.' In the latter perspective, a disconnect
would not be acceptable between the normative positions adopted by international law scholars and courts on the one hand, and the real-world
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1. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 5-6 (1999).
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possibilities of what is achievable, given state interests.2 Ultimately, ad
hoc advice could not be sufficient either.'
In response to this, a growing number of scholars are turning to the
social sciences to inform international law. This movement was started
nearly two decades ago at the intersection of international law and international relations.' It was, perhaps, only a matter of time until scholars
began to apply the sharpest analytic tools and the hardest empirical
methodology to international law: law and economics has reached the
discipline. It starts from the sometimes controversial but always thoughtprovoking assumption that states are self-interested, rational actors.'
The range of work already produced in this growing movement is
impressive.6 The economic approach to international law has largely focused on general issues of international law, such as questions of modes
of treaty making7 as well as treaty exit;8 the nature of customary international law;9 international adjudication;" ° and last but not least compliance,
reputation, and reciprocity in international law." Empirical studies have
2. See Laurence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities(Univ. of I11.Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-15, 2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=949052.
3. Compare ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995), with David H. Moore, A

Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 879 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor IntemationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw
and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Kal Raustiala &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw, InternationalRelations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew
S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A New Generation of InterdisciplinaryScholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L. 367 (1998).
5.

JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005).

6. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of InternationalLaw, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 28-33 (1999); Symposium, Rational Choice and InternationalLaw, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S1 (2002); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Public InternationalLaw (Chicago Working Paper
Series, John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 216, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=564383.
7. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in InternationalGovernance, 54
INT'L ORG. 421,421 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary InternationalLaw: A Response to
Professors Goldsmith and Posner,23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143 (2001); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1119-20 (1999); Andrew T.
Guzman, Saving Customary InternationalLaw, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 149-50 (2005); George Norman & Joel. P. Trachtman, The Customary InternationalLaw Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541 (2005);
Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative
States: InternationalRelations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 839
(2002).
10. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Stefan Voigt et al. eds., 2005); Tom
Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International
Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004).
11. See, e.g., George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International
Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826-27 (2002); Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in InternationalLaw, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 93 (2003); Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law:
Why Comply with the Public InternationalLaw of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323 (2000).
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helped our understanding of why international law takes the form that it
does, and they can also help us evaluate the conditions under which
treaty regimes are effective. Although thriving, the young law and economics of international law has barely touched upon many worthy topics.
Some questions that deserve further considerations include:
* Who should be modeled as rational actors: states and other legal
persons of international law, or those individuals-corporate and
collective actors- at the interior of the legal person who shape its
will? What could the behavioral turn, so popular in domestic law
and economics, mean for the analysis of international law?
"

What explains whether states bind themselves to treaties? By
what international law mechanisms do they incorporate international law in their national constitutions or law?

*

What explains the continued existence of customary international law?

How is rational choice analysis able to inform regime studies?
These are ambitious questions. The contributions to this special issue, though they involve a wide range of different approaches and topics,
share a commitment to using the core methodological assumptions of the
rational choice approach in seeking to answer them.
We do not assert that the rational choice approach is the only valid
way to study international law. Rather, our view is that the tools may
help to generate novel insights into both the possibilities and limits of international law, and may thus inform a realistic approach to global problems. The approach tends to proceed through positive analysis of why
institutions take the form that they do, explaining rather than suggesting
new doctrine, but many of the contributions also seek to engage and inform normative debates.
The papers published in this Symposium were first presented at a
conference at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
in Bonn, Germany in December 2006. In putting together the conference, we had two aims: one interdisciplinary and one intercultural. We
wanted to contribute to the nascent law and economics of public international law. We noticed, however, that the use of the rational choice approach to international law has been largely confined to the United
States, creating a methodological gap between European and American
international law scholarship. We sought to generate a trans-Atlantic
discussion not only about the substantive papers, but on the appropriateness of the rational choice approach to international law. The symposium therefore features a number of different approaches within the rationalist tradition, including empirical papers, formal modeling, and
game theory. Each American paper was accompanied by comments
from European international lawyers, several of which are included in
*
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this symposium issue. The cross-disciplinary and transnational nature of
the discussions were highly fruitful.
Our thanks go to the staff of the Max Planck Institute for Research
on Collective Goods in Bonn, as well as the editors of the University of
Illinois Law Review for their superb efforts in producing the conference
and symposium issue. We are also grateful to the Volkswagen Foundation for their generous support of the meeting.
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